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C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002404

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TAGS: [OSCE](#) [EUN](#) [PREL](#) [PL](#)

SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: POLAND SUPPORTIVE ON EU PEACE
CONSOLIDATION MISSION BUT DOUBTFUL OF PROSPECTS

REF: STATE 187131

Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Pol External Chief delivered reftel points to Mieczyslaw Kuzinski, action officer for global threats and the Eurasian conflicts in the MFA Security Policy Department. Kuzinski noted that Poland continued to support strongly efforts to develop an EU Peace Consolidation Mission (PCM) for Moldova, as it had since the idea first surfaced at the OSCE under the Dutch CIO in 2003 and the subsequent Dutch EU Presidency in 2004 (during the tenure of former OSCE HoM Moldova Amb. Bill Hill). He also commented that the U.S. proposals were very similar to the most recent paper of the Belgian CIO that was issued in June 2006.

¶2. (C) Kuzinski stressed that the first priority was to develop a consensus within the EU for such a PCM. Unfortunately EU member states were far from agreed on the approach, although Poland regularly lobbied both the Commission and Council in Brussels and other EU states on the urgent need for a common position. There was little prospect for such consensus in the short term, but the GOP would continue its efforts.

¶3. (C) Kuzinski agreed that it was very important to keep both Russia and Ukraine involved in any follow-on to the current Russian-led PKF, within the framework of limiting any one nation's participation to 25-30 percent of the entire force. The optimal solution would be an OSCE-mandated force, but there was little prospect of Russia ever agreeing.

¶4. (C) With regard to the deadlocked political settlement talks in Moldova and the stalled Istanbul Commitments process, Kuzinski lamented that the Russians had essentially "done nothing in over two years." He agreed that perhaps achieving EU consensus on a PCM would provide a jump-start to the settlement talks, and cited the surprising success of the EU Border Assistance Mission. He emphasized that the Istanbul Commitments were of overriding importance to the GOP.

¶5. (C) COMMENT. Poland has maintained a keen interest and active involvement in the Transnistria problem for over a decade. (Former FM Daniel Rotfeld was the first OSCE Special Rep for Transnistria in 1992, and the OSCE Mission in Moldova has routinely included a Polish staffer.) The GOP can be counted on to remain constructively engaged on Moldova in both the OSCE and EU contexts, as well as in its bilateral contacts with Ukraine. However, given the broad range of difficult issues currently in Polish-Russian relations, it is unlikely that Warsaw will engage on the issue bilaterally with Moscow. END COMMENT.
HILLAS